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THE "FEDERALISM QUESTION" in corporate and securities law-
that is, the proper dividing line between federal and state competen-
cies in this field-has caused significant jurisdictional skirmishing for
nearly a century. There were vigorous debates as to whether (and how
far) the federal government ought to intervene before Congress chose
to act in the early 1930s, and ever since, arguments about the nature
and limits on the federal presence, via the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), have persisted. Just as heated
have been the questions about the proper scope of state power to reg-
ulate the securities markets and the securities industry-state anti-
takeover legislation in the 1970s and '80s being but the most visible of
the issues that generated sustained judicial attention.1
Recently, both forms of the question have drawn renewed public
attention. By all accounts, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Sarbanes-Oxley")
has federalized more of what Congress used to leave to state corporate
law. While no doubts exist about the constitutional power of Congress
to regulate as broadly as it wants, some have certainly questioned the
wisdom of it doing so (not to mention the substance of the new regu-
lation).2 The SEC's proposed rule to enlarge shareholder access to
the corporate ballot also engendered strong criticism on both legal
and policy grounds, and this criticism effectively derailed it. Con-
versely, state activism in marketplace regulation surged in the last few
* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
An excellent paper by one of my seminar students elaborates on Delaware's insider trading
jurisprudence. See Lauren Reynolds, Delaware's Sacrifice: The End of the Brophy Doctrine (2005)
(on file with the author).
1. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529 (2005).
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years, marked by the efforts of Eliot Spitzer of New York and other
state regulators in such areas as mutual fund behavior and investment
analyst conflicts. That activism also triggered a strong counter-reac-
tion, including legislative efforts to get Congress to reign in the states.
These events have renewed a debate both political and intellec-
tual. Important scholars have long made the federalism issue a central
focus of their work. Louis Loss, William Cary, and others sought to
justify more federal power in the corporate arena-an argument that
held sway in intellectual circles until others launched a strong eco-
nomics-driven counterattack in the 1970s. Over the next two decades,
the pendulum swung in the direction of fervent celebration of state
primacy because of the benefits state competition for charters
generated."
Today the intellectual debate is far less one-sided, as I shall ex-
plain. Although critics of federal government intervention in the field
of corporate law still have a strong voice through influential scholars
such as Roberta Romano, Steve Choi, Larry Ribstein, and Steve Bain-
bridge, many others have questioned the virtue-even the existence-
of real state competition for charters4 and have made the case for
stronger federal protection of shareholder rights.5 In a remarkable set
of articles in the Harvard Law Review, Mark Roe has declared that,
while state competition might have occurred at one time, any "race" is
now over.6 Delaware has won, in terms of public corporations at least,
and has monopoly-like power. The federal government presents its
only true (and still largely potential) competition.
In this brief Essay, I offer some thoughts on both the theory and
the politics underlying the federalism question. My comments will
touch on some of the controversies and also look at a somewhat qui-
eter question, the state regulation of insider trading. Over the course
of the last few years, judges in California and Delaware have traveled
markedly different routes on questions involving the states' role in
regulating insider trading. A California court of appeal has recently
expanded the reach of the state insider trading statute to cover a
3. See FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAw vii, 5-6, 212-15 (1991) (noting that corporate law has an economic structure
and doubting that state competition may be a "race for the bottom").
4. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REv. 679 (2002).
5. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case For Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L. REv.
833, 836 (2005).
6. See Mark Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REv. 588, 590 (2003); Mark Roe,
Delaware's Politics, 118 -ARv. L. REv. 2491, 2493 (2005).
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claim alleging misconduct in California by an executive of a Delaware-
chartered company. 7 By contrast, Delaware Vice-Chancellor Leo
Strine has hinted strongly that Delaware courts should consider get-
ting out of the business of regulating insider trading entirely,8 not-
withstanding a venerable old Delaware case long cited for the
proposition that insider trading naturally breaches the fiduciary duty
of loyalty. 9 These contrasting approaches make a nice pair from which
to think through the federalism question free from the blinding glare
of controversy surrounding Eliot Spitzer, the shareholder ballot access
proposal, or Sarbanes-Oxley.
I. The Fundamentals: State "Primacy" as a Federal Choice
Some commentators employ a rhetorical trick by speaking of fed-
eral "incursions" on state primacy in corporate internal affairs. Consti-
tutionally, the federal government has the supreme authority on all
matters of interstate commerce, which certainly includes the field of
public company regulation. Whatever authority the states have over
public corporations comes from their historic role in chartering (and
thus regulating to some extent) corporate internal affairs, which Con-
gress has chosen to accept. Only federal acquiescence prevents a
change in roles-Congress could at any time pre-empt the field,
wholly or partially. Implicitly, state authority in this area extends only
so far as Congress wishes it to.
Congress has plainly elected to allow the states to retain primary
authority on matters of corporate structure, governance, and fiduciary
responsibilities. Congress also allows state "blue sky" securities regula-
tion within limits that it seriously tightened in 1996.10 However, there
is a strong federal presence largely in the form of rulemaking by the
SEC and the national stock exchanges. These bodies perform the role
of federal self-regulatory organizations.11
7. Friese v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 558, 563-568 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
8. Strine stated his position most notably in a case that also happened to involve a
California-based company incorporated in Delaware. See In re Oracle Corp., 867 A.2d 904,
930-936 (Del. Ch. 2004).
9. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
10. Congress tightened the limits on "blue sky" securities regulation under the Na-
tional Securities Markets Improvement Act. See Rutherford B. Campbell, The Insidious Rem-
nants of State Rules Respecting Capital Formation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 407 (2000).
11. See articles cited supra note 6. See, e.g., Robert Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to
"Mixed Governance" in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. Rrv. 721 (2005);
Renee Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625
(2004).
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Considerable overlap takes place in the field of proxy regulation
because, as originally enacted, the legislative history of section 14(a)
consists mainly of generalizations and does not point strongly one way
or the other on the question of authority.12 Most of what one can
unearth in the statute relates to disclosure. Congress noted that "l[t] oo
often proxies are solicited without explanation to the stockholder of
the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is
sought,"13 and it plainly saw the heavy veil of secrecy as a main source
of abuse. But the committee reports hint at broader authority for the
SEC. Over the past forty years, courts have invoked this language in all
of their major judicial decisions that address the proxy area. These
include expressions that "fair corporate suffrage is an important right
that should attach to every equity security bought on a public ex-
change."1 4 They illustrate Congress's desire to "control the conditions
under which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the
recurrence of abuses which ... had frustrated the free exercise of the
voting rights of stockholders."1 5 These quotes hardly suggest that Con-
gress draws the line strictly at disclosure; rather, they indicate that the
government has much more work to do at the federal level to protect
investors.
The same rings true with respect to another supposed "restric-
tion"-that federal securities law limits itself to disclosure and trans-
parency, leaving corporate mismanagement and fiduciary
responsibilities wholly to state control. As I have shown elsewhere, 16
what Congress could accomplish on matters within the realm of dis-
closure and transparency almost co-extends with the substantive regu-
lation in the first place. The going private phenomenon of the 1970s
and '80s serves to illustrate this point. Santa Fe Industries v. Green' 7 is
the landmark citation for a federalism-driven vision of separate
spheres of authority. In that case, the Supreme Court held that simple
breaches of fiduciary duty, which occur as part of corporate freeze-
outs, are outside the reach of Rule 10b-5.18 The Court stated in dicta
that the issue was something rightly left to the states. 19 But within a
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2006).
13. S. Rep. No. 73-792, at 12 (1934).
14. H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
15. Id. at 14.
16. Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe's Shadow: The SEC's Pursuit of
Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 487 (2001).
17. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
18. Id. at 473-74; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
19. Id. at 478-79.
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few years the SEC adopted a disclosure rule, 13e-3, requiring any
freeze-out transaction to include a disclosure document explaining
why the transaction treats investors fairly.20 Obviously, one cannot de-
scribe any unfair transaction as fair so any overreaching easily be-
comes a 13e-3 violation. 21 One can find similar patterns throughout
the substance of federal regulation. 22 Congress knows it and has for a
long time.
The interesting question, then, is not why the United States has
so much federal law, but why we tolerate so much state authority over
public corporations. After all, there is the problem of democratic le-
gitimacy. Certainly, no political theories can justify the power Dela-
ware courts and legislators have over the world-wide activities of a
substantial majority of the country's public corporations, unless one
believes that corporations are simply a private consensual arrange-
ment between shareholders and managers. So, why does Congress
leave the states any room in this area at all, whatever the extent of the
federal overlay?
Many academics would answer that Congress does so out of wis-
dom-introducing state-level regulatory competition arguably im-
proves the quality of the product over what a monopolist federal
regulator would produce. I certainly do not want to repeat the vast
literature on this question. Suffice it to say that many commentators in
the literature today hold a strong view that only "leisurely" competi-
tion, if any, takes place among the states.23 To be sure, Delaware could
lose its incorporation business by regulating abysmally, but it need not
consume itself with worry either. Congress still tolerates a large state
presence, including Delaware's primacy.
Mark Roe posits an intriguing idea; he argues that Congress has
made a strategic, savvy, and implicit political choice at the federal
level. Two interest groups-managers and investors-have the largest
mutual interest in matters of corporate and securities laws, and one
might expect them to compete with each other for dominance. But,
by all accounts, efficiency concerns require compromise; investors will
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (2006).
21. See Ralph Ferrara & Marc Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5 and the
New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 263, 273, n.49 (1980).
22. A fairly dramatic demonstration is the relative balance in litigation between fed-
eral and state claims regarding fiduciary obligation. See Robert Thompson & Hillary Sale,
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859,
909-10 (2003).
23. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk?: Recon-
sidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 555 (2002).
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not realize decent returns without granting managers a substantial
level of entrepreneurial autonomy, and managers will not gain access
to capital without credibly committing to some investor protection. In
purely political terms, one would expect the law-wherever it is pro-
duced-to mainly reflect these interests, with managers probably hav-
ing the advantage on close questions because they are less dispersed
and more organized.
So why then delegate this task to the states? Roe suggests that
both managers and the major suppliers of capital-who agree that
profitability should be the proper goal of the firm-recognize that
others may interfere with their negotiations. 24 Those other stakehold-
ers may hold profitability secondary in importance to something
else. 25 Labor presents itself as one organized source of interference, as
do more diffuse populist voices. These interests rarely have the power
to compete effectively and gain political strength, except in times of
economic troubles or scandal. But periodically, troubles and scandals
do occur. To the extent that corporate regulation exists as an entirely
federal scheme, managers and investors always run the risk that cur-
rent events will upset their negotiations.
What managers and investors likely want then, is to place corpo-
rate regulation in a place removed as far as possible from this political
risk.26 Delaware plays the role perfectly. The state shows little interest
except in maintaining its incorporation and legal services revenue,
and it certainly does not display an inclination toward populist senti-
ment. Delaware can comfortably concentrate on balancing manager-
investor interests in the name of corporate profitability so long as it
keeps in mind two simple imperatives: first, do not alienate either
manager or investor interests so that their frustrations cause them to
seek political alliances elsewhere; second, do not alienate Congress so
that it takes over the jurisdiction. One can understand much of Dela-
ware corporate law as the product of this strategy. 27
24. See articles cited supra note 6.
25. See, e.g., David Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist
Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 108-10 (2003) (recognizing that corporate law has a public
rather than private character).
26. Obviously, the scandals or troubles could be strong enough that Congress simply
federalizes the entirety of the law. But that is a daunting task because it involves regulating
a great deal of new territory. In other words, the harder this task, the less likely it is to
happen.
27. For a similar claim, see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the
Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1573, 1588-89 (2005).
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There are, of course, forty-nine other states, plus the District of
Columbia and the territories. Some other states might have per-
formed the function, but Delaware took the lead early on and devel-
oped a deep corporate law regime that now gives it an un-erodable
advantage. Other large states like New York, Illinois, and California
retain some domestic public corporations, but they have a tenuous
grip on them-reincorporation elsewhere presents few obstacles so
long as the directors and shareholders agree. However, these states
have political dynamics much like the federal government, where
troubles and scandals can lead to public claims of corporate accounta-
bility at the expense of maximizing profit. Congress has no reason to
cede control over corporate governance to these states. Only the avail-
ability of a special situation like Delaware (or a Delaware political
equivalent) makes feasible the federalist arrangement that Congress
has chosen.
This story, of course, specifically focuses on corporate law. Securi-
ties regulation operates somewhat differently, although one can un-
derstand it in light of the same set of ideas. In 1933 and 1934,
Congress did choose to federalize securities regulation. 28 The exercise
plainly reflects an odd political moment: the stock market crash of
1929, the Pecora hearings in Congress, and the onset of the Great
Depression all coincided, allowing populist sentiment in favor of
transparency and against manipulation (and more) to produce legisla-
tion that certainly would not otherwise have occurred-in anything
resembling that form, at least.
Whatever the political motivations, the legislation produced a
two-fold jurisdictional effect. First, it created a counterweight to state
corporate law that made the threat of incursion into areas of govern-
ance and fiduciary responsibility more palpable, setting in motion the
creative tension that Roe describes: the threat of federal regulation as
"Delaware's Competition." 29 Second, it created greater democratic le-
gitimacy because something approximating concurrent jurisdiction
emerged; the federal government took a role in the regulation of in-
terstate corporate behavior that made the posture of deference to the
states less jarring.
As to state securities regulation, Congress made an explicit
choice. It put savings clauses in the securities acts that authorized con-
28. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat.
881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
29. See articles cited supra note 6.
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currency absent actual conflict. By doing so, Congress specifically rec-
ognized the virtue of leaving states free to regulate small business
matters and to continue their practice of passing on registered public
offerings to local residents. That specific authority saved the state laws
from Supremacy Clause invalidity. In 1996, as noted earlier, Congress
cut back considerably on the permissible scope of state regulation of
the offering process, but it left state enforcement efforts alone.
We will return later to some of the bigger controversies that arise
out of this political choice. For now, it might be interesting to look at
a much quieter issue-the proper scope of state insider-trading
regulation.
II. State Insider Trading Regulation: Delaware Versus
California
California regulates insider trading by statute in its corporate se-
curities law.3 0 Section 25402 bars insider trading by the issuer or by
officers and by directors or by controlling shareholders; 3' section
25502.5 creates a derivative cause of action to seek disgorgement of
insider trading profits. 32
The question posed in Friese v. Superior Cour 3 3 was essentially
whether courts should construe the statute as corporate or securities
law. 34 If the former, then the statute would only apply to firms incor-
porated in California, not to the trading at issue in Friese. The case
involved a San Diego-based corporation, Peregrine Systems Inc., that
was incorporated in Delaware.35 The trial court treated the statute as
corporate law and dismissed the complaint; the court of appeal re-
versed and reinstated the claim.36
By contrast, Delaware treats insider trading as a breach of fiduci-
ary duty, which makes it a matter of judicial rather than statutory in-
terpretation. A 1949 decision of the Chancery Court, Brophy v. Cities
Service Co.,37 recognized a derivative cause of action to recover insider
trading profits, and that decision stood as an oft-cited (albeit infre-
quently applied) expression of Delaware law in the decades that fol-
30. See Don Berger, Issuer Recovery of Insider Trading Profits Under Section 25502.5 of the
California Corporation Code, 21 PAC. L.J. 221 (1990).
31. Cal. Corp. Code § 25402 (West 2006).
32. Cal. Corp. Code § 25502.5 (West 2006).
33. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
34. Id. at 571.
35. Id. at 561-62.
36. Id. at 561.
37. 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
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lowed. In the last couple of years, however, Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine
has written a series of opinions-most recently in In re Oracle Corp.38-
asking whether Brophy is still good law and signaling the possibility
that Delaware might abandon the field. Strine's main point is that
now (as opposed to when Brophy was decided) the federal government
thoroughly regulates insider trading so that state intervention creates
potential for duplicative efforts, at best, and inconsistency and con-
flict, at worst. 39
The California and Delaware cases juxtapose nicely, one aggres-
sively expansionist, the other extraordinarily restrained. What is going
on here? As to the California statute, the text of the statute certainly
does not limit its jurisdictional reach to companies incorporated in
California. Nonetheless, I think the trial court's holding in Friese
makes more sense. 40 To agree with me, one must understand what
insider trading regulation is really all about. Courts and commenta-
tors who have thought deeply about insider trading see that it really
has very little resemblance to "fraud in the inducement" and other
common bases for fraud liability. It causes no reliance or any individu-
alized injury. When federal courts call it fraud, their actions obscure
the justification for insider trading regulation, which takes a very dif-
ferent tone. Insider trading can cause harm to a corporation (threat-
ening secrecy). It can also widen bid-ask spreads in the market
(raising the cost of capital). 41 Finally-and more controversially-it
can dampen investors' willingness to invest as a matter of economic
culture. Each justification provides a plausible reason to discourage
insider trading by making it unlawful, but calling it fraud is a sleight of
hand, a convenient result-oriented way of getting to the right result
notwithstanding the absence of specific federal statutory authority.42
38. 867 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2004). See also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch.
2003).
39. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978) (Indiana law). In In re Oracle,
Vice-Chancellor Strine does not reach the issue because he finds insufficient evidence of
insider trading in terms of actual misuse of information. 867 A.2d at 907. One curious
feature of the opinion is the assumption that the plaintiff has to show that the possession of
the information caused the insider to trade in order to avoid a conflict with the scienter
requirement under federal law. The SEC, however, has established, via Rule 10b5-1, that
misuse is not the test; mere possession is. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2006).
40. See also In re Sagent Technology Inc., 278 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
41. For the best collection and evaluation of arguments for and against insider trad-
ing regulation see ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 274-75 (1986).
42. See Donald Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1337 (1999).
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For example, consider a case where insider trading occurs in Cali-
fornia with respect to shares of a Delaware corporation like Peregrine.
California's jurisdiction, as a matter of "securities regulation," would
have more clarity if some identifiable injury to California investors ex-
isted. But as noted above, that does not occur with insider trading; the
marketplace harms are too diffuse. Further, the kinds of harms that
might come to the corporation increasingly resemble others that oc-
cur when insiders place their interests above their employers' inter-
ests-but that sits squarely within the realm of corporate law.
California might still find that when conduct occurs in California,
the conduct entitles it to regulate regardless of where one feels the
harm or how one feels it, which is true. I do not argue that California
could not permissibly proscribe the kind of behavior alleged at Pere-
grine, rather, I assert that it is being aggressive. In so doing, California
addresses a space already occupied by the federal government. Given
the ambiguity in the statute, I am not sure that California's courts
should take such an aggressive stance without stronger evidence of
legislative intent.43
I react to Vice-Chancellor Strine's suggestion that Delaware aban-
don insider trading entirely in just the opposite fashion. To be sure,
the SEC (with congressional endorsement) has thoroughly regulated
insider trading as a form of fraud, presumably for the market-based
reasons described above as well as its own political agenda. But the
SEC engages in blunt regulation of a "bad act," not careful policy en-
gineering. Thus, it remains hard to imagine that a state would inter-
fere with the scheme by pushing harder.
In fact, many scholars who have looked at insider trading have
concluded that state corporate law has a better claim to the regulation
of insider trading than the securities laws do. 44 Corporate property-
based rationales for restricting insider trading, which would normally
be the province of state law, have a strong theoretical basis, even
though a federal scheme of surveillance and detection would engen-
der efficiency advantages. In principle, it remains hard to see why the
43. The statute is particularly corporate law-like in two respects. First, the primary
enforcement mechanism is a derivative suit. Second, it is limited to trading by officers,
directors and large shareholders-the main kinds of fiduciaries under corporate law. Any
harm to the market that flows from insider trading has nothing to do with the status of the
trader. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice
Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REv. 1589, 1596 (1999) (recognizing
that perhaps states have the better claim to regulating insider trading, but that federal
regulation has occupied the field).
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mere presence of federal regulation should call an otherwise valid
state claim into question, much less cause a state judge to preemp-
tively abandon it. As noted earlier, concurrent jurisdiction increas-
ingly has become the order of the day.
So what is the Vice-Chancellor-otherwise such a strong propo-
nent and craftsman of Delaware's primacy in corporate law-seeking
to accomplish? Roe's thesis suggests an answer. Recall that Delaware
has a compelling interest in having Congress acquiesce and leave the
most fundamental matters of corporate law to the states, a posture
that seemed at risk in the aftermath of the financial scandals. In re-
sponse, Delaware judges became increasingly vocal and argued for the
historic division of responsibility to continue, hoping to avoid the risk
of confusion from too great an overlap.45 Ceding insider trading to
exclusive federal regulation is a diplomatic way of saying-mainly to
the SEC-that each side should stay out of the other's primary respon-
sibilities as much as possible. The implication is that the SEC ought to
reciprocate on the fundamentals of corporate law.
That theory, to me, explains Delaware. In turn, one can only un-
derstand California's assertiveness as the opposite side of the coin.
When California regulates insider trading without a distinctive or indi-
vidualized harm felt there, it smacks of populism, an appeal that still
has resonance even as the financial scandals recede in memory. One
does not see that type of action from Delaware, which has implicitly
promised management and organized capital that it will not threaten
the common bond of wealth maximization. California can indulge it-
self because Delaware still offers the necessary safe haven for the dom-
inant economic interests, and insider trading lacks the same level of
importance that corporate law does. But if California seeks to take the
approach to its logical conclusion, by systematically regulating all
forms of corporate fiduciary misbehavior simply because they occur in
California, the system would lose stability, and Congress would have to
step in. Even though California exhibits far less concern about state
primacy than Delaware, it probably would not want that outcome ei-
ther, and so the issue will likely stay relatively quiet and confined.
45. See, e.g., William Chandler & Leo Strine, The New Federalism of the American Corporate
Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REv.
953 (2003).
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HI. Bigger Controversies
The approach set forth above decribes the situation but does not
necessarily make a normative judgment. To summarize, it describes
the political economy of state-federal relations in corporate and secur-
ities law in top-down terms, noting that the division of authority re-
flects Congress' political preference rather than some natural order of
things.
The description helps one to pose the questions that grow out of
the more recent controversies properly. Once again, everyone should
stop speaking of federal "incursions" into state corporation law. Con-
gress holds the ultimate power on matters of interstate commerce,
and only by congressional preference do the states have any role in
regulating beyond their own borders. Putting aside questions about its
wisdom, Sarbanes-Oxley is a national response to a perceived national
problem. It exists as a revision of a long-standing political bargain
rather than a power grab. And one could say the same about SEC
initiatives. Statutory authority governs the question: how much of this
policy-making did Congress delegate to the Commission, and how
much did it keep for itself? "States' rights" do not exist in the relevant
analysis apart from Congress' preferences. Given that the SEC acts as
Congress' primary agent for holding the potential of federalization
over the states,46 a considerable degree of delegation exists. However,
without a doubt, Congress wishes, for political reasons if nothing else,
to keep some choices to itself.
Turning to state activity, federal preference again governs. Some
securities laws reflect a policy preference that the SEC cannot deal
with some-presumably localized-securities matters. Thus, state en-
forcement serves as a useful supplement. Because one cannot easily
articulate the dividing line between what constitutes a localized or a
national matter, the statutes do not limit the scope of the state action.
Hence, any judicial challenge to the states' activity would have to ar-
gue that the federal government's actions have filled the field com-
pletely, which is unlikely to be true. For instance, even in mutual fund
regulation, which has laws that probably exhibit the same scope as any
46. John Coates has described the SEC-in terms not unlike Roe's description of Del-
aware-as a way of moving issues away from the political arena where there is risk of stake-
holder interference with corporate wealth maximization. See John Coates IV, Private v.
Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political Cost-Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531,
534-35 (2001).
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law at the federal level, courts and the SEC have long recognized the
concurrent role of state law. 47
One could argue that state laws address conduct insufficiently
connected to the acting state, making them invalid under the Com-
merce Clause. But, with few exceptions, the states' aggressiveness has
not gone that far. For example, Eliot Spitzer targeted schemes that
were launched mainly on Wall Street and had significant effects there.
Thus, Congress will have to be much clearer than it has been for "in-
cursions" like Spitzer's to be impermissible.
Whether those incursions are normatively good or bad is another
matter entirely. Simply from a public policy standpoint, the argument
for having aggressive state enforcement beyond essentially local mat-
ters underscores Roe's point. Because Congress presumptively central-
izes the matter at the federal level, it is easier for business interests to
influence the regulatory process in a way that denigrates the interests
of the less-well-organized-retail investors particularly. Having fifty
states with potentially concurrent jurisdiction creates a check on that,
and there exists reason to suspect that Spitzer and other state officials
have caused the SEC to act in ways in which it would not have
otherwise.
That said, however, the absence of any clear line tempts the states
to overreach, especially in times of scandal when the threat of federal
backlash decreases. The dangers of state criminal prosecution, espe-
cially on the fairly loose standards of something like New York's Mar-
tin Act,48 are disabling enough to give prosecutors leverage on matters
of industry conduct that those in the industry would otherwise resist.49
Local state-level politics should not determine basic policies in the se-
curities industry. Thus, Congress always has a principled argument for
removing particular matters from state authority.
What the future will bring depends on the states. There exists
some reason to believe that some state regulators value their ex-
panded vision of the states' role for both political and economic rea-
sons-financial settlements have produced a good deal of money as
well as publicity. And now that everyone recognizes the states' role, it
would be hard for the states to pull back without seemingly bowing to
47. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
48. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-c (McKinney 2006).
49. This is especially so because of the collateral consequences of a criminal convic-
tion. For example, under Section 9 of the Investment Company Act, any adviser convicted
of a securities related crime is presumptively barred from managing a mutual fund. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-9 (2006). Obviously, no major investment firm can afford that risk.
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political pressure. But the states need to remember that they compete
with federal regulation in a way which may be constitutionally aggres-
sive and that, under the circumstances, Congress could change at any
time. I suspect that all the relevant actors know this, and the states will
judiciously stop short of triggering a backlash. Indeed, as scandals and
troubles fade, less incentives will exist to press the issue in the first
place. If so, the federalism tensions will quiet down, at least until the
next episode of troubles and scandals arise.
